I had responded to Callum's suggestion that contingency predicated on necessity is actually necessary ...by pointing to the fact that Callum's alternate scenario also creates a problem for Tremblay..
I obviously went too fast. I was commenting on your rejection of Tremblay premise 1. The argument revolves around the relationship between necessary and contingent things. Firstly I showed that you are wrong to reject premise 1 since it denies that the mental has anything necessary about it. However, if you try to avoid this by messing with premise 3 (my suggestion about necessary -> necessary), you get a nonsense.
From Tremblay:
Posit X is a feature of human understanding.
1. X is necessary or has a necessary part.
2. If theism is true, then divine creation obtains.
3. If divine creation is true, then all in the universe is contingent to God’s act of creation, and nothing in the universe is necessary.
4. If theism is true, then no X can be necessary or have a necessary part. (from 2 and 3)
5. Theism is false. (from 1 and 4)
That is, X, could be scientific principles, physical laws, morality, logic, etc. Anything humans understand.
This means that they are not Necessary, but Contingent and therefore it is impossible for them to be Absolute, or even principles since they all are contingent on Gods whim.
It is still possible that some or all could be absolute. If God is true therefore everything is contingent on God but if God is absolute then things that are contingent on God can also be absolute. If God exists and is absolutely truthful and absolutely logical then those characteristic could carry forward. [/quote]
RF I think you are making a non-traditional distinction here between 'true' (which we have all agreed elsewhere to be a relationship between statements and reality) and 'absolute' (I'm not certain what features you are trying to pinpoint with this) and 'necessary'. I syuspect that you are simply doing your usual debating trick of 'muddying the waters'. The relationship between necessary concrete things and necessary abstract things, and the nature of entailment from necessary things to others is one that is unresolved (see the ref barney gave - oops, forgot, you don't want to be burdened by serious discussion). Certainly your introduction of new, ill-defined terms won't resolve it.
[/quote]In Tremblay's posit, the error is that postulate 1 is not a given. It is not a given that any feature of human understanding is necessary in any way with or without God. It is possible that a feature of human understanding is correct, but it is not necessarily so.[/quote]
I commented on premise 1 in Tremblays argument. You obviously didn't have chance to read it properly... here it is again, with some additional notes.
Now, if we posit human understanding as something non-physical i.e. existant in its own right as dualists must, then there is the problem of how it can be 'free-standing'....
As a dualist, you are commited I think to the mental being part of the 'spirit world' - please correct me if I'm wrong. It therefore has to have something that makes it distinguishable, identifiable from all other things in that realm (even if it is part of a unity, that unity has to be identifiable). Thus the brief dscussion of the 'essence' of a non-material mind...
This is achieved by assigning it a property of essentiality or this-ness - a sort of of label for the substancethat it represents independent of any other properties. It is this idea of haecceity (this-ness) that is is problematic. For A human's understanding - yours for example - to exist it has to have something about it that marks it as yours and as the faculty of undestanding... you would probably choose some notion of 'soul' (though, of course, would not agree to define or discuss it). It is this precise quality that would give the 'soul' its substance - and yet you say it is not necessary.
....because you deny Tremblay's premise 1.
So, your soul would not exist.
... because it does not have any necessary part and an essence must be necessary.
Aha, say you, but my soul is contingent upon gods doing/being something.
This sort of picks up/summarises some of the Stanford article (such a pity you can't read it!). However I assume that you would want to say that 'souls' are in some way 'coming from' god. It is this entailment that is now a problem, because....
But if god is necessary, the 'contingent' relation is not contingent in any fashion we use or understand. Things that are entailed by necessary things are themselves necessary1. So either your 'soul' is necessary or god isn't2 - we are back to Tremblays argument.
1So I am here replacing the Tremblay premise that things entailed by a necessary being are 'contingent upon' his doing or being (which you appear to support) with the alternative that things that are entailed by necessary things are themselves necessary. This holds good for logic (relationships between modal statements).
2So, if we take Tremblay with the original premise 3, we find that your only objection (human understanding has nothing necessary about it) to be wrong and Tremblay is right. If we take it with my alternative, we find we have the conclusion that you came to....
If as you say that apearently contingent things that depend on necessary things are necessary, then in Tremblays argument in number 3 the universe is also necessary and indeed all is necessary.
You can interpret this as either saying that everything is deterministic (which I guess you can't, but I would rub my hands with glee) or that there is nothing contingent, which is what you did. But of course this is a nonsense - in other words Tremblay with my premise and a necessary god is absurd. I can't see any other possibilities of adjusting Tremblay to support your denial of premise 1, apart from starting premise 3 with an assertion that god is not necessary - but thats what its trying to prove anyhow.
I'm deeply suspicious of arguments both for and against god's existence - your sects may not 'know the mind of god', my meme-group accepts that we cannot know (not even a priori, not even by defining it into existence) anything of its properties or relationships. Arguments are therefore pretty airy-fairy and pointless. The main point of such as Tremblay's as far as I can see is to point to areas in our knowledge of logic that need thinking through and research... or from your point of view, some of your concepts and their relationships need definition

Anyway, I hope I clarified what I was arguing there. Its always hard and inviting confusion to go back and comment on the original, so if I didn't mange to explain exactly please ask and I'l try an different approach.