With regard to the notion of democracy, I've quoted (below) from two models from J. Rawls and Jurgen Habermas, I would be interested to gather opinions as to which of these two notions of political legitimacy people prefer and how they need sustaining.

I realise this a wide ranging debate, which is difficult to give simple answers but essentially my motive for asking is that I'm concerned, along with a great many other people, that our current practice of democracy is quite limiting because, on the one hand, many people shy away from political participation and, on the other, political participation in pluralistic societies especially, is hampered by the practicalities of either engaging in the extant procedures or organising an informed debate the outcomes of which find representation in parliament in order to improve extant procedures.

Any comments on this general area of the problems of democratic models would be welcome. Thank you!

“…our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy.” (Rawls,  1996, Political Liberalism, 217)

“Only those principles are valid to which all affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses” (Habermas, Between Fact and Norms, 1996, xxvi).

I don't see much difference between the Rawls and Habermas position here.

Both seek to create reasons or rationales for deriving legitimacy from the act of voting and transferring that over to the acts of governing.

The reason that this is significant and important is because 'voting to be ruled by representatives' is not really all that democratic.  Thus, there is an inherent need to create or derive some kind of rational justification to transfer the act of voting for some representative into a justification of government acts in the name of the people.  This is an enormously important field of interest in the literature of political science and economics.

The flaw is the assumption that voting to be ruled by representatives is a democratic principle.  it is not.  Voting for representatives to rule on one's behalf is a system designed to procure 'permission of the governed', nothing more, nothing less.

In a democracy, the people rule.  In a representative system, the representatives rule with the 'permission of the governed'.

Both Rawls and Habermas (and a whole host of other theorists) have spent their academic careers trying to produce elaborate and elegant reasons to fudge this principle in the interest of our representative rulers. 

Quibbling between various rationales for deriving theoretical legitimacy from voter preferences of representation misses the point that 'a system of rule by representatives' is not essentially democratic to begin with. 

Representive government functions reasonably well because of the implied consent of the governed is given, that is sufficient.  One cannot claim that this is essentially democratic though, and that's what Rawls and Habermas are assuming in their attempts to transfer the sovereignty of the individual voter into the sovereign power of government and call it democratic will.

That's pretty close, but not quite precisely correct (as far as I know since the poster of the OP has not followed up). 

The key to understanding the OP is in the quotations from Rawls and Habermas at the end of the OP (who happen to be two of the biggest and most important names in philosophy of the 20th century).

The key question pertains to the issue of claiming democratic legitimacy for any given government act (or use of government power and authority)).  When/why/how can any given act of a government be understood to have 'democratic legitimacy'?  Rawls and Habermas offer two rather different methods or criteria for judging this issue.

As a general rule, I much prefer Rawls to Habermas on a whole host of issues, including the one raised in the OP. 

All that being said, I didn't address either Rawls' or Habermas' position, but rather I took this line of the OP to heart:
Thus, in my original reply to the OP, I focused upon an argument that essentially adds another layer or question to the issue of democratic legitimacy and government acts by asserting that the essential 'democratic legitimacy' that is presumed to derive from our present system of voting of the citizenry is highly questionable in the first place, according to real democratic principles.

Both Rawls and Habermas are accepting that 'elite rule with the consent of the governed' is 'democratic'.  I'm saying that is only 'pretend' democracy.

Regarding dictionaries and words, the functional purpose of English language dictionaries is not necessarily to pronounce the "definition" of any given word.  Rather, dictionaries seek to record the ways and means words are actually used.  English is a living language.  It grows by popular will - dictionaries record this evolution over time.

And since our governments and society like to call our form of 'elite rule with the electoral consent of the governed' as 'democracy', then dictionaries will record this fact.

As a general rule, this issue is one of the most common grounds of philosophical disputes.  Words very often have a common meaning that is understood by all people.  Those same words often have precise and technical meanings to those who are academically trained in the topic.  Thus, two people can have vastly different understandings of the same word - such as 'democracy' or 'republic', to use to perfect examples.

I definitely follow the academic-technical definitions of these particular words.  To me, democracy always means 'rule by the people' and 'republic' always means rule by a 'non-hereditary elite' (almost always an oligarchy).  Common usage of these terms does not coincide with this at all - particularly in the USA.