yilmaz101
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« Reply #67 on: March 20, 2008, 11:31:20 PM » |
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Getting back to Realityman's claim that it was specifically Arab leaders that ordered the Palestinians out and that is the reason for the exodus we find a section in the said wiki article covering this specific issue: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_the_1948_Palestinian_exodus#The_.22Arab_leaders.27_endorsement_of_flight.22_explanation--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The "Arab leaders' endorsement of flight" explanationThe first explanation published of what caused the 1948 Palestinian exodus was that the Arab political and military leaders within Palestine and in surrounding countries actually told Arab civilians in Palestine to leave their homes so as to avoid any casualties of war with the expectation that they would return to their homes once the Arab armies destroyed the Yishuv. Proponents of this explanation also cite exaggerations in the Arab media and word-of-mouth rumors among the Arab civilians of atrocities committed by Jews against Arab civilians which caused a large percentage of Palestinian Arabs to flee fearing for their lives. Critics of this explanation say that the policy of the Arab states and the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee was to stop the flight. Most modern historians acknowledge that in some cases local commanders ordered evacuations out of harms way of women, children and the elderly. This would account for about five percent of the exodus.Criticisms of the "endorsement of flight" explanationMorris, with others of the New Historians school, concur that that Arab instigation was not the major cause of the refugees' flight[29]. They do acknowledge that Arab instigation during December 1947-June 1948 may have caused around 5 percent of total exodus[30][31]. As regards the overall exodus, they clearly state that the major cause of Palestinian flight was not Arab instigation but rather military actions by the Israeli Defence Force and fear of them. In their view, Arab instigation can only explain a small part of the exodus and not a large part of it[32][33][34][35][36][37]. Moreover, Morris and Flapan have been among the authors whose research has disputed the official Israeli version claiming that the refugee flight was in large part instigated by Arab leaders[38][39][40]. Additionally, the secretary of the Arab League Office in London, Edward Atiyah, wrote in his book, The Arabs: This wholesale exodus was due partly to the belief of the Arabs, encouraged by the boastings of an unrealistic Arabic press and the irresponsible utterances of some of the Arab leaders that it could be only a matter of weeks before the Jews were defeated by the armies of the Arab States and the Palestinian Arabs enabled to reenter and retake possession of their country. But it was also, and in many parts of the country, largely due to a policy of deliberate terrorism and eviction followed by the Jewish commanders in the areas they occupied, and reaching its peak of brutality in the massacre of Deir Yassin.There were two good reasons why the Jews should follow such a policy. First, the problem of harbouring within the Jewish State a large and disaffected Arab population had always troubled them. They wanted an exclusively Jewish state, and the presence of such a population that could never be assimilated, that would always resent its inferior position under Jewish rule and stretch a hand across so many frontiers to its Arab cousins in the surrounding countries, would not only detract from the Jewishness of Israel, but also constitute a danger to its existence. Secondly, the Israelis wanted to open the doors of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration. Obviously, the fewer Arabs there were in the country the more room there would be for Jewish immigrants. If the Arabs could be driven out of the land in the course of the fighting, the Jews would have their homes, their lands, whole villages and towns, without even having to purchase them.[41]Erskine Childers checked transcripts of all Arab radio services monitored by the BBC in 1948, and discovered that, '(T)here was not a single order, or appeal, or suggestion about evacuation from Palestine from any Arab radio station, inside or outside Palestine, in 1948', and that to the contrary broadcasts gave flat orders to civilians to stay put[42]. His point is taken by by Glazer (1980, p. 101), who writes that not only did Arab radio stations appeal to the inhabitants not to leave, but also Zionist radio stations urged the population to flee, by exaggerating the course of battle, and, in some cases, fabricating complete lies[43].More evidence is presented by Walid Khalidi[44]. In his article the author argues that steps were taken by Arab governments to prevent Palestinians from leaving, ensuring that they remain to fight, including the denial by Lebanon and Syria of residency permits to Palestinian males of military age on April 30 and May 6 respectively. He also notes that a number of Arab radio broadcasts urged the inhabitants of Palestine to remain and discussed plans for an Arab administration there.[45] According to Glazer (1980, p.105), among those who blame Arab news reports for the resulting panic flight are Polk et al.[46] and Gabbay[47]. They maintain that the Arabs overstated the case of Zionist atrocities, made the situation seem worse than it was and thus caused the population to flee, rather than to fight harder, as was hoped. According to Glazer, Gabbay, in particular, has assembled an impressive listing of sources which describe Zionist cruelty and savagery[48]. In this sense, Glazer (1980, p.105) cites the work done by Childers who maintains that it was the Zionists who disseminated these stories, at the time when the Arab sources were urging calm. He cites carefully composed 'horror recordings' in which a voice calls out in Arabic for the population to escape because 'the Jews are using poison gas and atomic weapons'[49].In the opinion of Glazer (1980, p.108) one of the greatest weaknesses of the traditional Zionist argument, which attempts to explain the exodus as a careful, calculated and organized plan by various Arab authorities, is that it cannot account for the totally disorganized way in which the exodus occurred[50]. In this sense, Glazer cites John Glubb's observation,
'Voluntary emigrants do not leave their homes with only the clothes they stand up in. People who have decided to move house do not do so in such a hurry that they lose other members of their family - husband losing sight of his wife, or parents of their children. The fact is that the majority left in panic flight'[51].
As regards the evidence provided supporting the idea that Arab leaders incited the flight of Palestinian population, Glazer (1980, p. 106) states:
I am inclined to prefer Childers [research] because the sources he cites would have reached the masses, who would then react accordingly. Radio was the most widely used form of communication, and the "horror recordings" were broadcast on the scene. Gabbay's evidence, newspapers and UN documents, were designed for outside consumption, by diplomats and politicians abroad and by the educated and influential Arab decision makers. This is not the kind of material which would necessarily have been in the hands of the common Palestinian. Thus I believe that Childers' contention, claiming that Zionist provocation had more to do with causing the exodus than backfiring atrocity propaganda, is borne out.Flapan[52]further maintains that to support their claim that Arab leaders had incited the flight, Israeli and Zionist sources were constantly "quoting" statements by the Arab Higher Committee to the effect that "in a very short time the armies of our Arab sister countries will overrun Palestine, attacking from the land, the sea, and the air, and they will settle accounts with the Jews[53]. He claims that some such statements were actually issued, but they were intended to stop the panic that was causing the masses to abandon their villages. In his opinion, they were also issued as a warning to the increasing number of Arabs who were willing to accept partition as irreversible and cease struggling against it. From his point of view, in practice the AHC statements boomeranged and further increased Arab panic and flight[54]. But there were a great many other statements that could not be so misconstrued. According to Aharon Cohen, head of Mapam's Arab department, the Arab leadership was very critical of the "fifth columnists and rumormongers" behind the flight[55]. When, after April 1948, the flight acquired massive dimensions, Azzam Pasha, secretary of the Arab League, and King 'Abdailah both issued public calls to the Arabs not to leave their homes[56]. Fawzi al-Qawuqji, commander of the Arab Liberation Army, was given instructions to stop the flight by force and to requisition transport for this purpose[57]. Muhammad Adib al-'Umri, deputy director of the Ramallah broadcasting station, appealed to the Arabs to stop the flight from Janin, Tulkarm, and other towns in the Triangle that were bombed by the Israelis[58]. On 10 May Radio Jerusalem broadcast orders on its Arab program from Arab commanders and the AHC to stop the mass flight from Jerusalem and its vicinity. Flapan considers that Palestinian sources offer further evidence that even earlier, in March and April, the Arab Higher Committee broadcasting from Damascus demanded that the population stay put and announced that Palestinians of military age were to return from the Arab countries. All Arab officials in Palestine were also asked to remain at their posts[59] The author claims that such pleas had so little impact because they were outweighed by the cumulative effect of Zionist pressure tactics that ranged from economic and psychological warfare to the systematic ousting of the Arab population by the army.
According to Flapan[60]the idea that Arab leaders ordered the Arab masses to leave their homes in order to open the way for the invading armies, after which they would return to share in the victory, makes no sense at all. In his opinion, the Arab armies, coming long distances and operating in or from the Arab areas of Palestine, needed the help of the local population for food, fuel, water, transport, manpower, and information. The author cites a report of the Jewish Agency's Arab section from January 3, 1948, at the beginning of the flight, which in his view suggests that the Arabs were already concerned with the possibility of flight, "The Arab exodus from Palestine continues, mainly to the countries of the West. Of late, the Arab Higher Executive has succeeded in imposing close scrutiny on those leaving for Arab countries in the Middle East[61]. Flapan maintains that prior to the declaration of statehood, the Arab League's political committee, meeting in Sofar, Lebanon, recommended that the Arab states "open the doors to […] women and children and old people if events in Palestine make it necessary[62], but that the AHC vigorously opposed the departure of Palestinians and even the granting of visas to women and children[63].Flapan[64]offers the following explanation for what he calls the "myth" of Arab-instigated flight. He claims that t served to cover the traces of the unsavory methods employed by the authorities (from the confiscation of food, raw materials, medicaments, and land to acts of terror and intimidation, the creation of panic, and, finally, forcible expulsion) and thus to exorcise the feelings of guilt. In many sectors of society, especially the younger generation. Many of them bore the burden of the operations that caused the Arab flight. Their feelings of moral frustration and revulsion were not easily eradicated.
In addition to alleviating guilt feelings, the myth served as a successful weapon in political warfare. It helped strengthen the age-old Zionist thesis that the Palestinians were not a people with national aspirations and rights but simply Arabs who could live anywhere in the vast expanses of the Arab world. On 4 May 1948, Ben-Gurion wrote that "history has proved who is really attached to this country and for whom it is a luxury which can be given up. Until now not a single Jewish settlement, not even the most distant, weak, or isolated, has been abandoned, whereas after the first defeat the Arabs left whole towns like Haifa and Tiberias in spite of the fact that they did not face any danger of destruction or massacre.[65]
This contention ignored the fact that the large majority of the Palestinians who fled their homes did not leave the country. Like many Jews caught in the same circumstances, they evacuated battle areas and moved to safer places[66]. The spontaneous movement of Palestinians back to the country-what was known then (and punished) as "infiltration," and which started even before the end of the war-and the persistent refusal of the majority of the Palestinian refugees to "rehabilitate" themselves in Arab countries must certainly be considered demonstrations of the tenacity of their attachment to their homeland.
The myth of voluntary exodus became Israel's major argument against accepting even partial responsibility for the refugee problem, not to mention consideration of the refugees' right to repatriation.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- sources from the said article: (By the way I have acess to issues of the Journal of Palestine Studies up to 2004, in case anyone would like a copy of any of the articles I can source them for you)
1.^ Erskine Childers, 'The Other Exodus,' The Spectator, May 12, 1961 reprinted in Walter Laqueur (ed.) The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict,(1969) rev.ed.Pelican Books 1970 pp.179-188 p.183 2.^ a b c d Steven Glazer, 1980, 'The Palestinian Exodus in 1948', J. Palestine Studies 9(4), p. 96-118. 3. ^ Walid Khalidi, 1988, 'Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine', J. Palestine Studies 18(1), p. 4-33, earlier published in 1961 4. ^ a b c d Reported by Philip Mendes, A historical controversy : the causes of the Palestinian refugee problem; retrieved from the Australian Jewish Democratic Society website on 1 November 2007. 5.^ B. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 2004 pp.5-7,pp.38-64,pp.462-587 6.^ B. Morris, 'Response to Finkelstein and Masalha', J. Palestine Studies 21(1), p. 98-114 7.^ a b Benny Moris, 1998, "Review of 'Fabricating Israeli History: The "New Historians."' by Efraim Karsh", J. Palestine Studies 27(2), p. 81-95. 8.^ Simha Flapan , 1987, ‘The Palestinian Exodus of 1948’, J. Palestine Studies 16 (4), p. 3-26. 9.^ I. Pappé, 2006, ‘The ethnic cleansing of Palestine’
29.^ Miron Rapaport (11.08.2005). No Peaceful Solution. Ha'aretz Friday Supplement. 30.^ Flapan, Simha (1987): The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987, p.89 31.^ Morris, Benny (1986): The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: the Israel Defence Forces Intelligence Branch Analysia of June 1948. Middle Eastern Studies 22, January 1986, pp. 5-19 32.^ Morris, Benny (1988°): The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 294 and p. 286 33.^ Morris, Benny (1986): Yosef Weitz and the Transfer Committees, 1948-49, Middle Eastern Studies 22, October 1986, pp. 522-561 34.^ Morris, Benny (1986): The Harvest of 1948 and the Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Middle East Journal 40, Autumn 1986, pp. 671-685 35.^ Morris, Benny (1985): The Crystallization of Israeli Policy Against a Return of the Arab Refugees: April-December, 1948. Studies in Zionism 6,l(1985),pp. 85-118 36.^ Flapan, Simha (1987): The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987 37.^ Flapan, Simha (1987): The Palestinian Exodus of 1948. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4. (Summer, 1987), pp. 3-26. 38.^ Kochan, Lionel (1994): Review of The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-4944 by Benny Morris. The English Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 432 (Jun., 1994), p. 813 39.^ Lockman, Zachary (1988): Review of The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem by Benny Morris; 1949: The First Israelis by Tom Segev and The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities by Simha Flapan. Middle East Report, No. 152, The Uprising (May, 1988), pp. 57-64 40.^ Abu-Lughod , Ibrahim (1989): Review of The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities by Simha Flapan; The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 by Benny Morris and Palestine 1948: L'expulsion by Elias Sanbar. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter, 1989), pp. 119-127 41.^ The Arabs, 1955, pp. 182-183 42.^ Erskine Childers, 'The Other Exodus,' in Laqueur, op.cit. p.183. 43.^ Childers, E. (1971): 'The Wordless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees' in The Transformation of Palestine, ed. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evenston, Northwestern University Press), pp.186-87. The period under discussion is April to mid-May 1948. Cited by Glazer, S. (1980): 'The Palestinian Exodus in 1948'. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4. (Summer, 1980), pp. 96-118. 44.^ Khalidi, W.(1959): Why Did The Palestinians Leave?. Middle East Forum, Vol.XXXV, No. 7, pp. 21-24 45.^ Ibid, pp.22-24. Cited by Glazer (1980), p. 101. 46.^ Polk, W.; Stamler, D. and Asfour, E.(1957): Backdrop to Tragedy-The Struggle for Palestine, Boston: Beacon Hill Press. 47.^ Gabbay, Roney (1959): A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict. Geneva: Librarie E. Doz. 48.^ Gabbay, p. 90 49.^ Childers: The Wordless Wish, p. 188 50.^ The author cites the examples of Syrkin, Marie (1966): The Arab Refugees: A Zionist View. Commentary, Vol.41, No. 1., p. 24. Schechtman (1952), p. 6-7 and Kohn, p. 872. 51.^ Glubb, John (1957):A Soldier with the Arabs. London: Hodder and Stoughton, p.251 52.^ Flapan, Simha (1987): The Palestinian Exodus of 1948. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4. (Summer, 1987), p.5_6. 53.^ Cohen, Aharon (1964): Israel and the Arab World. Hebrew, Tel Aviv, p. 433. 54.^ Ibid, p. 39 and p. 41. 55.^ Ibid, p. 460. 56.^ Ibid, p. 461. 57.^ See Mutzeiri, Ha'aretz, 10 May 1948. 58.^ Menahem Kapeliuk, Dauar, 6 November 1948. 59.^ . Khalidi, "Why Did The Palestinians Leave?". 60.^ Flapan, Simha (1987): The Palestinian Exodus of 1948. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4. (Summer, 1987), p.5. 61.^ Political and Diplomatic Document of the Central Zionist Archives (CZA) and Israel State Archives (ISA), December 1947-May 1948 (Jerusalem, 1979), doc. 239, 402. 62.^ . See CZA, 52519007, quoted by Yoram Nimrod in A1 Hamishmar, 10 April 1985; see also ISA, 179118, 1 March 1948. 63.^ . See Khalidi, "Why Did the Palestinians Leave?". 64.^ Flapan, Simha (1987): The Palestinian Exodus of 1948. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4. (Summer, 1987), p.23-24. 65.^ . Ben-Gurion, War Diaries, at the first meeting of the People's Council, 4 May 1948, 387.
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