Why is the USA supporting Iranian control in Iraq?

This is a long post that attempts to address the complex political situation in Iraq.  The purpose of this is to foster discussion about the question of what is the best policy for the US to pursue inside Iraq at this time, in order to achieve the official or 'ostensible' aims of the US deposition of Saddam and the subsequent establishment of a newly constituted Iraqi state with a more democratic flavor than the last one had.

My perspective on this issue is entirely that of the 'school' of realpolitique.  I favor the policy that works best.  I opposed the US invasion when it was originally proposed in 2002 on the grounds of pure 'realism' (that the US invasion would not actually serve the best interests of the USA - or anyone else for that matter!).  However, I've always defended the principle that the US/coalition invasion of Iraq was 'legal' by the UN Charter and the principles of international law (it is also legal because there has been no official and competent determination of illegality).  All of this is past history.  The deed is done.

As it stands now, my principle interest is to see the new state of Iraq become a sovereign, stable and functional national state - preferably of the quasi-democratic character, and one that does not pose a significant danger threat to the peace and security of any other nation.  That seems like a rational goal and about the best one can reasonably hope for given the circumstances of it all.


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First of all, I would like to point out that the SICI (Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, aka SIIC, SIRCI or SIC) is officially an Iranian organization and exclusively Shi'ite.  It was founded in Iran, modeled on the original Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Council of Iran - the organization that overthrew Shah and established the present regime in Iran.  The Badr Brigade in Iraq is the paramilitary arm of the SICI.  The Badr Brigade was also founded in Iran, trained and organized there.  This group is directly supported by the Iranian state with direct connections with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

The Iraqi branch of the SIC, won the largest number of seats in the Iraqi parliament in the 2005 elections, though it is to be noted that this party only had 8% of the popular vote (and thus has 25 seats in parliament). The number of political parties in Iraq's parliament is staggering, with about a dozen having as few as one seat in parliament, and another dozen or so parties with 10-19 seats.   There are 275 seats in total.

The SICI anchors the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) which is the name of the (Shi'ite) governing coalition which put first Allawi and now Maliki in as Prime Minister.  Other original members of this large governing coalition included Maliki's Dawa party, Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, Muqtada' Sadr's faction and several Kurdish parties (amongst a host of smaller parties and independent members).  It is to be noted that several factions have since left the UIA coalition alliance (mostly Kurds and Sadrists, but also Chalabi as well) leaving Maliki's parliamentary position seriously weak (they have a hard time making quorum in the Iraqi parliament right now) and vulnerable to deposition.

It is also to be noted that the SICI and Maliki's Dawa party are the only two parties in the Iraqi parliament that formally support the US military presence in Iraq (they represent about 10% of the popular vote from 2005).

Last week in Basra, the Iraqi Army (nominally under the control of the Iraqi governing coalition) launched an offence in Basra.  The official purpose of this operation was to 'root out criminal elements' who apparently (or unofficially) control the Basra region.  This was Iraqi government double-speak to refer to the fact that Basra has allegedly fallen under the control of the Sadrist faction or the Medhi Army.

There are many reasons some have suggested for this operation, but the most obvious one is the upcoming October 1st provincial elections in Iraq.  The previous 2006 provincial elections were boycotted by most of the Sunni groups in Iraq as well as by the Sadrists.  Thus, the provincial assemblies are  mostly controlled (at this time) by the SICI party.  Since both the Sunnis and the Sadrists have vowed to contest the upcoming October 1st provincial elections, the SICI is expected to lose control over a majority of the Iraqi provincial assemblies (since the Sunnis will likely take control of the Sunni provinces and the Sadrists will likely take control of many of the Shi'ite provinces in the central and south that are all mostly controlled by the SICI right now). 

Given that political control of the provinces is considered key for mobilizing, financing and organizing for the next Iraqi national election (due in 2009 or early 2010, I'm not sure which), it is easy to see why the SICI and Maliki would be highly concerned about who controls Basra at this time, given that it is the second largest city in Iraq and strategically important as the principal port and oil export terminal for Iraq.  If SICI is reduced in power across the provinces on October 1st, that will pretty much guarantee that SICI will not be the largest party in the Iraqi National parliament come the next election.

And that is what brings in the US interest here.  As noted above, the SICI and Maliki's Dawa party are the only two parties in the Iraqi national parliament that officially support the US military presence in Iraq.  If this governing coalition fails, it is very likely that the one that would replace it would legally demand the US military vacate Iraq - immediately if not sooner.  Thus, the US has a very strong interest here in upholding and supporting the SICI-Maliki political coalition against all other Iraqi political interests.

And thus, when the Iraqi Army got into trouble last week in Basra, stirring up a hornet's next of Medhi Army fighters, the US military jumped in, front and center, to help out with airstrikes in Basra and US armor units moving into the Sadr City enclave of Baghdad.

This is a clear cut case of the US military in Iraq being used to support the military-political agenda of one domestic Iraqi minority political faction to attack another domestic minority political faction (US is taking sides in the 'so-called' Iraqi civil war here).  The key item of significance is that the particular faction the US is supporting here is the one with the strongest official Iranian connections and the particular faction the US is opposing is the one party in Iraq that officially stands for Iraqi national unity and Iraqi nationalism (free of foreign political control) - that being the Sadrist movement.

And since the SICI is directly connected to the Iranian state, this means that the US military is directly supporting the goals of Iranian political control in Iraq. 

If that's not bizarre enough, we also have the odd spectacle of the Iranian-backed SICI officially supporting the US military presence in Iraq in the first place.  Iran and the US apparently have some political interests in common here inside Iraq.   

Certainly Iran holds the plug on the US position - if the Iranian-backed SICI stopped supporting the US presence in Iraq, the US would lose the only legal figleaf it has that it is not an 'occupying' force. Indeed, it really is only the SICI and Maliki that are standing in the Iraqi parliament upholding the legal basis of the US forces in Iraq as 'by invitation of the Iraqi government'.

As noted above, the Iraqi parliament is effectively paralyzed at this time due to the large number of present and potential defections from Maliki's UIA coalition (mostly Kurd and Sadr factions). The government will thus likely avoid any serious parliamentary confrontation - given that the government stands until it is defeated in parliament or at the ballot box. Thus, I wouldn't expect the Iraqi parliament to actually do anything between now and the next Iraqi national election. They just can't risk losing a major vote - if they lose a key vote, Maliki must resign and a new coalition would be formed. None of the parties in parliament seem to like this option (or stand to benefit) right now, so Maliki as PM is relatively safe (though almost powerless) for the time being.

So the US military presence is legally supported in Iraq at least until the next Iraqi national elections (I don't know when they are officially scheduled to occur, though likely sometime in 2009, four years after the 2005 election as per the Iraqi constitution).   Of course, the most significant political event in Iraq between now and those all-important national elections will be the provincial elections scheduled for October 1st, 2008.   

So that's my take on the present Iraqi political situation.  The US and Iran are 'defacto' allied right now with the common political policy of supporting the SICI-Maliki coalition to control the Iraqi state.  As such, they are both allied with the common policy of opposing the political rise of Muqtada Sadr and the Sadrist movement (supported by the Medhi Army).

The question here is, who the heck thinks this is a good policy for the USA?  How can US military  support for obvious Iranian political interests in Iraq be held to be beneficial to US interests?

And why is the US policy that of opposing the one political movement in Iraq that officially supports the official goals of the US/coalition invasion of Iraq in the first place?

That has been consistent US policy each year for five years now.

On what basis do you expect this policy to work in year six when it specifically failed to work in years one, two, three, four and five?

Ooorah!

If we give this thing a chance and let a real nation develop out of the chaos, we could end up with another democracy in the middle east.  (Problem is that the the Israelis and the Iraqis will be on the same side of the table! )

Yes, the partition of Iraq into three states has been mooted about by various media and political types now and again, but the very idea of it is considered a 'non-starter' by more serious analysts.  There are a couple of key 'flaws' in the plan that make it essentially impossible to implement. 

1. The Kurdish Problem - The Kurdish peoples are rather spread out between northern Iraq, eastern Turkey, western Iran and to a lesser extent, southern Russia.  This is a source of longstanding political tensions between all of these countries (a long simmering powerderkeg to be more accurate).  Turkey, with the largest block of minority Kurds (and the biggest problem with Kurdish separatists) has a long standing policy that it will militarily crush any sovereign independent Kurdish state.  Iran seems highly disposed to support the Turkish view here.  And Russia has stated that they would support the Turkish view on this matter (on principle of quashing separatist minorities of which Russia has lots) - and Russia has a veto in the UNSC so that would prevent any UN interference in any Turkish conquest of any proposed independent Kurdistan.  Ergo, independence for the Kurds is off the table.  The long suffering Kurds (at least the more pragmatic ones) seem to understand the unmalleablity of this state of affairs.

2. A tripartite division of Iraq, essentially along ethno-cultural-religious groupings (Kurdish north, Sunni west and Shi'ite southeast) produces three very unequal states with two of them (Kurds & Shia) having lots of oil and the third (Sunni) having none.  Thus, the Sunnis have every reason to reject this model and fight against it.

3. A tripartite division of Iraq would, in all probability, just ultimately end up with Turkey, Iran and Russia destroying Kurdistan, Iran absorbing the Shi'ite provinces and the small Sunni enclave smoldering on as a haven for terrorism.

Ergo, the proposed tripartite division of Iraq is not considered feasible on any grounds.

Btw, I believe that the State of Iraq (like Transjordan and Palestine) was mandated by the League of Nations and put under British protection.  Britain this didn't officially create Iraq.

Giving this topic more thought, it has occured to me that the Iranian position here appears to be the more explicable one.

That is to say, some elements of the Bush Administration have over the last 2-3 years been rather bellicose with respect to Iran, implying or suggesting that the use of US military force against Iran was a distinct possibility in the very near future.

It doesn't take Sun Tzu to figure out that the Iranians thus actually do have a strong interest in seeing US military forces bogged down in Iraq.  A small investment from Iran in political support for all sides of the Iraqi conflict is thus directly in Iranian short term interest in preventing any proposed American military action against Iran.  Keeping the US military in Iraq longer and longer acts as a drain on US domestic political support for any potential operation against Iran in the near term.

Please note that my argument here is not one of military prowess, the US does retain an immense power to 'hit' Iran even with 150,000 troops bogged down in Iraq.  My argument here is entirely a political argument based on the issue of US domestic politics supporting such an operation, not the US ability to launch one.

Wouldn't friendlier relations with Iran actually be a better idea?

Iran is/was closer to a natrual revolution than Iraq was, and now with the threat of Hussein gone, a revolution could take place. If not, a peaceful transition seems imminent given the larger, younger generation's disposition to western culture.

If Iran can become semi-democratic and continues to have western ambitions, negotiations could reduce the threat of Iran in Iraq, which means radical elements lose support, the government loses motivation to "crack down" on security, which gives time to the Iraqi army to be trained and the political process to restart (hopefully without the radical and corrupt elements that exist today), which allows for the US to begin withdraw.

And the result? TWO semi-democartic governments in the Middle East for the price of one.

And how do we do this? We DON'T piss off Iran. We stop saaying they're gonna start WWIII, we stop putting military assets on their coasts and borders and we start trying to negotiate this nuclear buisness without prior conditions. And, for the love of God, we DO NOT BOMB THEM.

All that will do is turn an entire generation of western-inspired people against us... and that happened already once before. Remember? Mujhadeen? Yeah... let's avoid that, shall we?

This is a long term policy initiative, which runs counter to US foreign policy in the past - usually short-sighted concerns over "the now" rather than "the later".

I know it's poorly detailed and possibly innacurate, but given what I've read on Iran, they're on the crest of a revolution... so why ruin it?

I don't think they support thier control but realize that they have influence in Iraq by the way 1-2 years ago Iran denied any involvement in Iraqi affairs. Iran is getting cocky with the report from IAEA and NIE, and others countries failing to do something other than sanctions. Now Iran has its eyes on Iraq knowing that the US will not attack do to the recent situation. But they fail to realize that Bush and Cheney is crazier than Chavez and Ahmadinejad combined so I predict around early fall late summer Iran will get its wish of a real confrontation with the Bush administration.

USA has destroyed Iraq. And themselves.